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“I hasten to point out, however, that there remains a great deal of unresolved confusion in 
the literature over the extension of both ‘offensiveness’ and ‘harmfulness,’ i.e., is the set 
of all offensive things a subset of harmful things, does it merely intersect with the set of 
harmful things, or are the two wholly distinct? Obviously the way in which this question 
is answered will have a bearing on just how many principles justifying coercive 
legislation liberals generally adhere to. Indeed, this has been a nettlesome problem for 
some time, a problem that can be traced back to Mill’s famous ‘exception’ to the Harm 
Principle allowing for legislation to prohibit ‘offenses against indecency.’ ” 
David Shoemaker
1
   
  
 The basic aim of this work is to resolve the “great deal of confusion” that exists 
about the relationship between harmfulness and offensiveness. Specifically, this work 
argues that an acceptance of liberalism’s basic model of harm and offense (as 
justifications for the legitimate use of the criminal law) requires an acceptance of the 
relationship between harm and offense expounded here. I do not attempt to argue for 
accepting the harm and offense principles over the sovereignty (or any other) principle; 
instead, I argue for its necessity if one subscribes to basic models of harm and offense. 
On a broader note, the overarching purpose of this work is to extend the current literature 
on the principles that demarcate legitimate from illegitimate criminal law. Legitimate 
criminal law prescriptively defines the realm of actions and behaviors that the liberal 
                                                 
1
 David Shoemaker, “Dirty Words and the Offense Principle,” Law and Philosophy 19 (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000), p. 545. 
 iv 
state may choose to criminalize (e.g., assault, rape, murder), whereas the illegitimate 
arena defines that conduct which must be protected from criminalization by the state 
(e.g., merely offensive thoughts, revolutionary ideas). It is important to note that 
legitimacy constrains what the liberal state may criminalize; however, it leaves open to 
practical considerations the criminalization of what will fall within the legitimate realm of 
the criminal law. There are many examples of activities that may appropriately satisfy the 
liberal society’s principles of legitimate criminalization, but which criminal law may be 
ineffective in handling; the harms of secondhand cigarette smoke is one such example. 
 What is the context of this discussion of harmfulness, offensiveness, liberty, and 
the criminal laws? It is the liberal society whose ultimate telos or end is to guarantee 
individual liberty and equal opportunity for individuals to pursue any allowable belief-
system. In such a liberal state, there are general principles that underlie the legitimate 
criminalization of specific activities. The two most well-known principles are the “harm 
to others” principle and the “offense to others” principle. The “harm to others” principle 
states that conduct causing wrongful harm to others is always a legitimate reason for the 
criminalization of such conduct. The “offense to others” principle states that conduct 
causing wrongful offense to others is always a legitimate reason for the criminalization of 
such conduct. In the extreme liberal position, only the harm principle guides the creation 
of the criminal law; in the liberal position, both the harm and offense principles underlie 
state coercion of liberty.  
 It is important to note that the current literature on the relationship between 
harmfulness and offensiveness is – at best – scarce; indeed, the very lack of scholarly 
examination might be the source of the existing confusion. Most notably, A.P. Simester 
 v 
and Andrew von Hirsch suggested underlying distinctions between harm and offense in 
their article “Rethinking the Offense Principle.” They claim that:  
 … [H]arm involves the impairment of a person’s opportunities to engage in  
 worthwhile activities and relationships and to pursue valuable, self-chosen goals. 
 In this sense, harm is prospective rather than backward-looking; it involves a 




 By contrast, at least paradigmatically, offensive behavior does not reduce a 
 person’s opportunities or frustrate his goals. Rather, it causes the victim distress 
 without adversely affecting the sorts of interests that are the concern of the Harm 
 Principle. … In this sense, offense is experiential rather than forward-looking: the 
 affront suffered by V need not, though it may, suffer the cessation of the offensive 
 conduct. Hence offended states are not in themselves a harm, since they do not 
 necessarily imply any prospective loss of opportunity on the part of the victim. … 




In chapter 2, I discuss how Simester and von Hirsch’s distinction applies to the concept 
of harmful offensiveness, and where the flaws in their distinctions lie.  
 This work attempts to transcend recent analyses of the relationship between harm 
and offense. In doing so, it goes beyond the current philosophical mainstream of modern 
social and legal ethics by developing a systematic understanding of a particular problem 
rather than focusing on a solution that applies only to a narrowly-tailored niche. I aim to 
provide answers to many central questions including:  
 Are Joel Feinberg’s distinctions among harms, hurts, and offenses consistent 
with his use of the harm and offense principles? Do they resonate with our 
considered judgments? How does (or should) the notion of reasonableness 
play into offenses generally as well as the application of a liberal offense 
principle? 
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 Are there activities which may not be criminalized under the harm or offense 
principles, but that should be criminalized (per our considered judgments)? In 
light of an overlap between harm and offense, should those activities in the 
overlap be subject to regulation and why? If so, should they be governed by 
the harm principle? The offense principle? An entirely new principle? 
 How does Feinberg’s account of harm and offenses, constructed in the late 
1980s, handle more contemporary cases of harm and offense, specifically the 
“new” child pornography that has evolved in the past decade? 
 I will navigate the overlap between harm and offense by employing a similar 
method to Joel Feinberg in his four-volume series, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 
My thesis does not implore the necessity of any higher-order morality (e.g., Millian 
utilitarianism or Kantian deontology) to justify its argumentation; rather, we will seek to 
maintain the reflective dynamic equilibrium between our practical, considered judgments 
and the theoretical abstractions we explore. Much like Feinberg’s works, this is not 
intended to serve as a practical guide by answering social science questions or arguing for 
(or against) empirical claims. Instead, my thesis generally aims to be practical through its 
clarifying conceptual boundaries of harm and offense and the general principles which 
underlie public policy.  
 My work is divided into two parts. In Part I, I propose an original model for the 
relationship between harms and offenses, using Feinberg’s magnum opus as an initial 
guide. After arguing for a revised harm-offense model, I propose a new liberty-limiting 
principle to guide criminalization of the established overlap between harm and offense. In 
Part II, the proposed model will be applied to recent legislation concerning the private 
 vii 
possession of a new type of child pornography. Since the second part functions as a 
contemporary application of the proposed modern, empirical evidence must be included 
and questions of social science must be addressed. 
 It is essential that the reader retain the focused image of the forest on his retina 
while navigating the trees, so to speak, throughout this construction of a new liberty-
limiting principle. A thorough background of Feinberg’s work is first necessary (Chapter 
1). Then, two seemingly-unrelated concerns about Feinberg’s model of harm and offense 
will be explained (Chapters 2 and 3) and each of these concerns will be used to 



























Chapter 1: Harms, Hurts, and Offenses 
 
 In The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Joel Feinberg seeks to distinguish the 
different categories of what the public might refer to as the underlying reasoning of the 
criminal law, and to show how these different conceptions factor into the regulation of 
individual liberties vis-à-vis the criminal law. To accomplish this, Feinberg divides 
actions into those that are “hurtful to others,” “harmful to others,” and “offensive to 
others.” As we shall see, Feinberg argues that only the latter two categories of actions 
may be rightly criminalized under their respective liberty-limiting principles. To illustrate 
how legitimate criminalization of conduct is achieved through those principles, it is first 
necessary to understand Feinberg’s distinctions among harms, hurts, and offenses.  
 
Feinberg’s Basic Distinctions 
 According to Feinberg, “harm” refers to “those states of set-back interest that are 
the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions by others.”
4
 Harm is constituted by a (1) 
wrongful (2) setback (3) of someone’s welfare interests (4) without defensibility or 
justification.
5
 By wrongful, Feinberg refers to the violation of that person’s rights. Rather 
than assessing a right as natural or legal, Feinberg analyzes it as a “valid claim against 
another’s conduct.”
6
 What gives rise to such valid claims? Feinberg argues that any 
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welfare interest itself gives rise to claims against others.
7
 Generally speaking, welfare 
interests themselves serve as the grounds for “valid claims against others,” or rights. 
 By interests Feinberg means the narrow class of welfare interests (distinguished 
from other interests and non-interests, such as “passing wants,” instrumental wants,” and 
“focal aims”/“ulterior interests”).
8
 Welfare interests are interests in “maintaining that 
minimum levels of physical and mental health, material resources, economic assets, and 
political liberty that are necessary if we are to have any chance at all of achieving our 
higher good or well-being, as determined by our more ulterior goals.”
9
 Examples of 
welfare interests include one’s bodily autonomy, individual privacy, and preservation of 
one’s private property. Welfare interests that can be protected by the criminal law need 
not be restricted to only personal stakes, but also includes two types of public interests: 
community and governmental interests. Community interests are those “so widely 
shared” by individuals that can be ascribed to the community itself, such as public peace 
and health, “security from foreign enemies, and a sound economy.”
10
 Governmental 
interests encompass those interests that are ipso facto created by the act of governing, 
such as revenue collection, pursuing legal justice through court proceedings, and so forth. 
Feinberg concludes that, while these public interests are ultimately individuals’ interests, 
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An act of poisoning the water supply invades a community interest and directly 
harms me; the bribing of a public official harms me only indirectly or remotely, 
but it threatens direct harm insofar as it endangers the operation of government 




 A welfare interest is setback when an individual, community, or government 
interest is placed in a worsened condition than it would have been before the act 
occurred. For example, A’s wounding B with a knife results in A harming B, since A’s 
attack is a: 
(1) wrongful (e.g., the violation of a person’s right to bodily autonomy and 
physical well-being) 
(2) setback (e.g., the person’s physical well-being is made worse than had the act 
not occurred) 
(3) of B’s welfare interests (e.g., B’s self-interest in his own well-being) 
(4) without defensibility (e.g., A did not instruct B to attack him or voluntarily 
consent to B’s attack). 
It is important to note that our ulterior or focal interests can only be protected by the 
criminal law to the extent that our welfare interests require protection; the criminal law 
cannot generally protect against infringements of focal aims to cure breast cancer, walk 
on the moon, or competing in the Olympics.
12
 
 Those actions which cause disliked experiences that do not necessarily harm us 
are distinguished from harms and divided into hurts and offenses. Feinberg differentiates 
hurts from harms by pointing out that hurts do not involve the violation or setback of 
welfare interests because there “is no interest in not being hurt as such, though certainly 
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we all want to escape being hurt, and the absence of pain is something on which we all 
place a considerable value.”
13
 Hurts can include such experiences as watching a very 
poor movie or hearing a low-volume of grating static from a neighbor’s outdoor radio. 
Hurts may rise to the level of harms if they are repeated or persistent enough; however, 
hurts per se cannot be criminalized under the harm principle due to the lack of setback to 
any welfare interest. 
 The other disliked, but not necessarily harmful, category is that of offenses. 
Feinberg’s elements of offense include the (1) wrongful (2) production of an unpleasant 
or uncomfortable, “universally disliked mental state” in a person (3) without defensibility 
or justification.
14
 This could include such examples as exhibitionism in the form of public 
nudity or public sexual intercourse or demeaning personal insults that cause offense. 
Feinberg separates mere offenses from mere harms in several ways: 
• Mere offenses are “harmless because they do not lead to any further harms 
besides interest in not being offended.”
15
  
• “Offenses are a different sort of thing altogether [from harms], with a scale all 
their own” (that is, the scale of harm and the scale of offense are 
incommensurate with each other).
16
 
• Offense is “surely a less serious thing than harm” (that is, the scale of harm is 
always much more serious conduct, and thus more broadly deserving of legal 
prohibition than the scale of offense).
17
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 The infamous problem for liberal theory that arises from restricting offensiveness 
is whether bare knowledge of those offenses is sufficient to justify their criminalization. 
According to Feinberg, the offense principle (and thus, the criminal law) can only apply 
to cases of personally affronting offenses. In other words, Feinberg distinguishes 
profound offenses from mere nuisances in that the former are non-experiential states of 
being offended produced by bare knowledge of such conduct and the latter are personally 
affronting experiences that result in offended states. For example, the profound offense 
that consenting adults are enjoying a raunchy orgy in the house three doors down from 
me does not fall under the jurisdiction of either the offense principle or the criminal law. 
My experience of people engaging in the same activity on a public street corner, 
however, can be legitimately prohibited as a mere nuisance under the offense principle. 
Bare knowledge of an act is not enough to qualify as an offense for purposes of 
criminalization; the narrow class of prohibited offenses must be of a personal nature.  
 
The Feinbergian Harm-Offense Scales 









FEINBERG’S HARM-OFFENSE SCALES 
 
 
The Basics of Liberty-Limiting Principles 
 Feinberg’s harm-to-others principle and offense-to-others principle share several 
characteristics of liberty-limiting (or coercion-legitimizing) principles generally. Liberty-
limiting principles state that a “given type of consideration is always a relevant reason” in 
support of criminalization, even if there are other existing reasons that outweigh it. By no 
means are liberty-limiting principles themselves either sufficient or necessary conditions 
for legitimate criminalization. Liberty-limiting principles are not sufficient for limiting 
liberty because a supposedly relevant reason might not outweigh the “standing 
presumption in favor of liberty.”
18
 Additionally, no liberty-limiting principle is sufficient 
for justifying legal coercion because, although a given law is legitimate, its 
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implementation may be impractical or minimally effective. Nor are any of these 
principles individually necessary for legitimate criminalization, since a law may be 
justified by another liberty-limiting principle. Taken together, however, all of the liberty-
limiting principles that are subscribed to by a given society are necessary for justifying 
legal coercion on liberty; that is, if legal coercion is not justified by any liberty-limiting 
principle, then the legal coercion is illegitimate. 
 
The Harm Principle 
  Using his aforementioned definition of harm, Feinberg develops his harm 
principle to provide legitimate limits on individual liberty: that which causes wrongful 
harm to others is always a relevant reason for legitimate criminalization. The harm 
principle must have many secondary considerations (or mediating maxims) in order to 
make it a practically useful legislative tool. Although Feinberg lays out a number of 
mediating maxims to be considered in any case of harm, the most important include the 
following: 
 Volenti maxim (“Volenti non fit injuria”): If John voluntarily consents to a 
harm or foreseeable risk of a harm by Freddy’s actions, then Freddy’s harmful 
action is not indefensible or unjustifiable (one of the requirements of a 




 De minimis maxim (‘De minimis non curat lex”): If John’s harms by Freddy 
are “minor or trivial,” then they cannot be criminalized under the harm 
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principle. State coercion of trivial acts will likely cause more harm than it 
prevents through direct infringement of John’s interests, Freddy’s interests, 
and those of third parties. 
 Abnormal Susceptibilities maxim:  John’s abnormal vulnerabilities to certain 
kinds of harm cannot serve as a claim for protection by interfering with the 
“normally harmless activities of others people.”
20
 However, if John’s 
vulnerability is easily identifiable (e.g., wheelchair paralysis), then the law 
may legitimately require others to avoid harming such people when it does not 
require serious inconvenience for others. 
 Risk maxim: If Freddy’s actions are not certain to result in harm, then risk of 
harm (consisting of the gravity and probability of the harm) must guide the 
criminalization of such actions, with gravity referring to the magnitude of 
harm and probability referring to the likelihood of its occurrence. The greater 
the risk of harm, the less reasonable it is to accept the risk (and thus the more 
legitimacy given to limitations on such conduct). For example, though 
Freddy’s waving a gun in a seemingly deserted city street may not produce a 
great probability of harm, the gravity of such harm (e.g., fatality and severe 
injury to others) compensates for the lowered probability, and creates a high 
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The Offense Principle 
 The primary consideration for whether conduct counts as an offense is whether it 
is a wrongful production of an unpleasant or uncomfortable disliked mental state in a 
person without defensibility by another person, keeping in mind that offenses must be 
affronts against individuals (and not merely cases of bare knowledge).  If conduct meets 
these criteria, then Feinberg’s offense-to-others principle applies under a “balancing 
metaphor” of mediating maxims to determine whether legitimate state coercion of such 
conduct is justified. Feinberg lays out his offense principle as a modified version of tort 
law, weighing factors on the part of the offender and the offended. On the part of the 
offender, three maxims are considered:
21
 
 Redeeming Social Value: The greater the importance of the offending conduct 
to both the individual offender’s way of life and to society at large, the less 
legitimate the criminalization of such conduct. 
 Alternate Opportunities: If it is possible that the offending conduct might have 
been performed at times or places causing less or no offense to others, without 
serious inconvenience to the offender, then criminalization becomes more 
legitimate. 
 Motivation: The greater the extent to which the offensive conduct is motivated 
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The “reasonableness of the offending party’s conduct” is determined by:
22
 
 Extent: The greater the extent of the offense (determined by its intensity, 
duration, and scope of effect), the more legitimate the criminalization of such 
conduct. 
 Reasonable Avoidability: The greater the ability of the offended party to 
reasonably avoid the offensive conduct in question, the less legitimate the 
criminalization of such conduct. 
 Volenti maxim: If the offended party consents to the conduct (either directly 
or as part of foreseeable consequences), then reasons for legitimate 
criminalization will be weighed less heavily. 
 Abnormal Sensibilities: If the offended states produced in a person are the 
result of abnormal sensibilities of the offended person, then reasons for the 
state coercion of the offense will be weighed less heavily. 
 To summarize, an offender’s conduct is legitimized to the extent that the offense 
is socially and personally important, necessary in its time and location, and unmotivated 
by spite. On the other hand, an offender’s conduct would be criminalized to the extent 
that the offense is intense, lengthy, affects a large number of people, is not easily 
avoidable or consented to, and not due to the abnormal sensibilities of the offended party. 
 To illustrate how these two sides are weighed, consider the following example of 
a completely-nude Mark masturbating on a bench in Central Park for a half-hour during 
lunchtime. Mark’s action is of minimal social importance, although it may be of 
moderate personal importance; it may certainly be relocated to the privacy of his home, 
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where it causes less or no offense to others, without causing serious difficulty to Mark; 
Mark’s masturbation is unmotivated by spite (as he, let’s say, doing so purely for 
personal pleasure and not with the specific intent of offending anyone). Looking at the 
offended party, the intensity of the offense is moderate, its duration fairly lengthy (lasting 
about a half-hour), and affects a large number of angry New Yorker businessmen in 
nearby cafes. Mark’s self-pleasure is not easily avoidable by other people on their way to 
and from work and lunch breaks, and certainly not the result of abnormal sensibilities of 
the offended party. In this example, the scale of legitimacy (accurately) weighs heavily in 








Chapter 2: Revising Feinberg’s Harm-Offense Model 
 
 Having given a general overview of Feinberg’s model, chapters 2 and 3 focus on 
resolving two chief inconsistencies within the model. Addressing these two 
inconsistencies are of paramount importance in developing the “harmful offense to 
others” principle in Chapter 4 that will legitimately regulate whatever lies between the 
categories of harm and offense. This chapter will examine the relationship between harm 
and offense overlooked in Feinberg’s distinctions and the current literature. 
  
Feinberg’s Relationship Between Harm and Offense 
 Despite his meticulous work, Feinberg’s distinctions between harm and offense 
result in an inconsistency that must be resolved before continuing further in our analysis. 
Feinberg concludes that harms are wrongful setbacks to welfare interests generally and 
offenses are the wrongful productions of offended states in individuals. In order to 
compare harms and offenses, the following question must be answered: does this 
wrongful production of offended states in oneself regard a welfare interest, other interest, 
or a non-interest? Feinberg’s account of harm and offense implicitly argues that the 
interest in not being offended must be a welfare interest, since the liberal state may 
legitimately criminalize infringements of welfare interests only and Feinberg’s offense 
principle regulates a narrow class of offenses. That is, because Feinberg allows a narrow 
class of offenses to be legitimately criminalized and the only objects of legitimate 







involve infringements of welfare interests (as opposed to infringements of passing wants 
or focal aim). 
 But why should we accept offenses as infringements of welfare interests and not 
as violations of transient desires or infringements of our focal aims? Arguing that we 
wish to criminalize certain offensive actions, and that they must concern welfare 
interests, begs the question why offenses regard welfare interests only in the first place. 
Simply put, not being severely offended is central to maintaining mental security and 
autonomy, much as not being assaulted is central to maintaining bodily security and 
autonomy. It would be inaccurate to characterize an interest in “not being offended” as 
either a transient desire or focal aim. Transient desires represent those Feinbergian 
passing wants, such as the desire for Cici’s pizza, which fade or disappear as a result of 
being sufficiently met, enough time passing, etc. The interest in not being offended 
remains constant, whether time passes or the interest is met. Focal aims, on the other 
hand, represent those goals towards which we aspire, such as attending Yale or curing 
cancer; the interest in not being offended is a not an aspiration, but rather a stake on 
which we depend to maintain our minimal state of existence that is necessary to achieve 
those focal aims. 
 When these two distinctions of harm and offense qua welfare interests are 
juxtaposed, offenses become a definitional subset of the class of harms; that is, wrongful 
setbacks to the welfare interest in not being offended (offenses) are necessarily a subset 
of wrongful setbacks to welfare interests generally (harms). This conclusion – I’ll call it 







because they do not lead to any further harms, besides interest in not being offended.”
 23
 
The inclusion of “further harms, besides interest in not being offended” strongly implies 
that offenses are narrowly harmful, and thus lends credence to the Subset Thesis of harms 
and offenses. 
 However, Feinberg’s apparent inconsistency comes when he states that “offenses 
are a different sort of thing altogether [from harms], with a scale all their own” (I’ll call 
this the Separation Thesis).
24
 This statement supporting the Separation Thesis is directly 
opposed to the Subset Thesis of harms and offenses; if offenses are wholly contained as a 
narrow subset of harms, then they cannot be completely separate from harms “with a 
scale all their own,” and vice versa.
25
 Feinberg’s distinctions in the above paragraph and 
his statement in this paragraph seem to endorse both the Subset Thesis and the Separation 
Thesis.  
 Problems arise if the Subset Thesis is correct. If offense simply involves a 
narrower infringement of one’s welfare interests than does harm, then the class of 
offenses is simply a subset of the class of harms. However, this is problematic. If offenses 
are necessarily and wholly contained within the class of harms (as Feinberg’s language 
suggests), then the offense principle becomes redundant and unnecessary.
26
 The entirety 
of mere offenses (being wholly a subset of harms) would be regulated under the harm 
principle, nullifying the value of a now-redundant offense principle. Now falling under 
the harm principle, mere offenses qua harms would be regulated to the same degree and 
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 Indeed, there is a significant portion of literature by philosophers dedicated to arguing that Feinberg’s 
offense principle is tautological and excessive. See also A.P. Simester and Andrew von Hirsch, 







in the same manner as harms. This inclusion of mere offenses as a subset of harms results 
in any wrongful personal affront (in the form of an offense) being sufficient to justify 
limitations on liberty under the harm principle. In light of this analysis, consider 
Feinberg’s following examples of offense: 
• Story 9: At some point during the trip the passenger at one’s side quite openly 




• Story 11. A strapping youth enters the bus and takes a seat directly in your 
line of vision. He is wearing a T-shirt with a cartoon across his chest of Christ 




• Story 19: A youth (of either sex) is wearing a T-shirt with a lurid picture of a 
copulating couple across his or her chest, in which the couple depicted is 
recognizable (in terms of conventional representations) as Jesus and Mary.
29
 
• Story 31. A counter-demonstrator leaves a feminist rally to enter the bus. He 
carries a banner with an offensive caricature of a female and the message, in 
large red letters: “Keep the bitches barefoot and pregnant.”
30
 
 If mere offenses were wholly contained as a subset of harms, then all of the above 
examples would result in legitimate coercion of individual liberty under the harm 
principle, but for the wrong reasons. Why does this occur? Under the harm principle, the 
primary requirement for criminalizing conduct is that it must create wrongful setbacks to 
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others’ welfare interests; since all such offenses create wrongful setbacks to others’ 
welfare interests in not being offended, all of these offenses would be criminalized as 
causing wrongful harm to others. For example, story 31 would be criminalized to the 
same extent as story 9 simply because they are wrongful setbacks to persons’ welfare 
interests in not being offended (by the harm principle), rather than in virtue of whether 
story 31 and story 9 have sufficient considerations of each act’s nature to outweigh the 
presumption of liberty (as is the case under the offense principle). For instance, in story 9 
the offense principle would likely be used to criminalize the woman’s depositing of her 
sanitary napkin due to its unavoidability, lack of social value, etc., and other 
considerations of the nature of the act. In story 31, the offense principle would not 
criminalize the counter-protestor’s message due to its social value, lack of alternate 
relocations, etc., and other considerations of the act. Under the Subset Thesis, 
offensiveness as a subset of harmfulness causes offenses to be criminalized to a similar 
degree and for the same reasons as harms. The Subset Thesis seems an unlikely view for 
Feinberg because this consequence is exactly what Feinberg is attempting to avoid – the 
criminalization of a large class of offenses merely because of their offensive nature 
instead of being due to considerations of the nature of the offender and the offended.  
 What if the Separation Thesis is Feinberg’s position – if offenses and harms are 
distinct and separate categories? The next section will show why harm and offense are 
not wholly distinct, and that there are actions which may fall between the classes of harm 
and offense. Indeed, the proposed understanding of Feinberg’s account of harm and 
offense does not fit under either the Subset Thesis or the Separation Thesis, but rather 








The Proposed Relationship Between Harm and Offense  
 David Shoemaker points out that “there remains a great deal of unresolved 
confusion in the literature over the extension of both ‘offensiveness’ and 
‘harmfulness’.”
31
 By analyzing the definitional boundaries of the two concepts, the 
relationship between harm and offense can be expounded in further detail. For Feinberg, 
harm is a wrongful setback to welfare interests generally and offense is a wrongful 
setback to the particular welfare interest in not being offended.  
 With this analysis, the realms of harm and offense are not “wholly distinct,” but 
rather, both lie on the same spectrum of wrongful setback to welfare interests. Thus, 
Feinberg is mistaken (according to the position that he has expounded) when he states 
that “offenses are a different sort of thing altogether [from harms], with a scale all their 
own.”
32
 Harm and offense differ from each other merely in what kind and what degree of 
welfare interest is setback. Consider the proposed spectrum: 
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Rather than separate harm and offense scales, the relationship between harm and offense 
is better described by their conjoined presence on the broader scale of wrongful setbacks 
to welfare interests. Harm and offense, in turn, are merely two manifestations of wrongful 
setbacks to welfare interests. Pure (or mere) offensiveness is the wrongful setback of the 
welfare interest in not having those offended states produced in oneself; pure (or mere) 
harmfulness is the wrongful setback of a welfare interest other than in not having 
offended states produced. This is where the proposed model diverges from Feinberg’s. 
By specifically excluding the interest in not having offended states produced from the 
realm of harmfulness, offensiveness no longer becomes a subset of harmfulness (thus 




HARM + OFFENSE 
“Wrongful Harm to 
Others” Principle 
“Wrongful Offense to 
Others” Principle 
“Wrongful Harmful 









avoiding the problems with the Subset Thesis stated earlier). Additionally, the Separation 
Thesis is also nullified, such that offensiveness and harmfulness may (and do) still 
overlap in the area of harmful offense, i.e., those actions which are neither criminalized 
under the harm or offense principles, but which should be criminalized (per our 
considered judgments) in a liberal society. 
 Why is there any good reason for separating welfare interests generally from the 
welfare interest in not being offended? I will discuss this distinction in detail towards the 
end of this chapter, but the basic reason concerns differences in the kind of welfare 
interest each involves.
33
 Welfare interests generally – for example, a minimum level of 
physical and mental health, security over one’s own private property, etc. – are defined 
by their non-normative nature. However, the welfare interest in not being offended is 
marked by its largely normative definition. Although both are different kinds of related 





The Nature of Harmful Offenses 
 Harmful offenses must intertwine elements of pure harms and pure offenses, such 
that harmful offenses are: 
(1) acts or omissions of an act 
(2) that are wrongful 
(3) setbacks of 
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(4) two kinds of welfare interests: 
 (G) the general welfare interests (element of harmfulness, e.g., bodily  
              autonomy, security of self, etc.), and 
 (O) the specific welfare interest in not being offended (element of      
              offensiveness) 
(5) without moral defensibility or excuse. 
What kind of actions would constitute harmful offense, but would fall under neither pure 
harms nor pure offenses? Here I enlist a parallel to Feinberg’s 31 stories of a ride on a 
bus stories. In each of the following scenarios, the reader should imagine herself on her 
way to work or some other appointment through a large city park; in each case, finding 
another route would greatly inconvenience the reader or such a route is not easily 
available (lack of a vehicle, scheduling of the city light rail, etc.). 
 Scenario 1: A group of mourners carrying a coffin sit in the park along your 
direct route. Their demeanor, however, is “by no means funereal. In fact they 
seem more angry than sorrowful, and refer to the deceased as ‘the old 
bastard,’ and ‘the bloody corpse.’ At one point they rip open the coffin with 




 Scenario 2: Each day, a stationery person of the opposite sex yells vulgar and 
implicitly threatening comments at the reader that would fall under sexual 
harassment, e.g., “I should come and show you a good time” or “That 
miniskirt is asking for some lovin’.” 
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 Scenario 3: Same as above, except the stationery person is of the same sex as 
the reader. 
 Scenario 4: Same as Scenario 2, except the person of the opposite sex follows 
you to your place of employment (rather than remaining stationery) while 
continuing their verbal tirade. 
 Scenario 5: Same as above, except the person is of the same sex as the reader. 
 Scenario 6: Each day, a person (male or female) waits with a rose, coffee, or 
some other gift, directing comments at the reader such as “This is for you, my 
love” “Why do you keep refusing me?” and becoming verbally hostile in tone 
(without any direct threats). 
 Scenario 7: Each day, a person (male or female) waits with a dead flower, rat 
corpse, or other “gift,” directing similar comments in a similarly hostile tone 
without any direct threats. 
 Scenario 8: While walking through the park, the reader accidently bumps into 
a jogger running in the opposite direction, and the jogger responds with 
expletives and comments such as “Watch where you’re going, you might get 
hurt” or “Get out of the way – I wouldn’t want anything to happen to you,” 
and continues jogging in the opposite direction. 
 Scenario 9:  Same as above, except the jogger (instead of continuing in the 
opposite direction) turns and follows you, making the same sort of comments. 
 Scenario 10: An unidentified man hands out flyers in the park. The flyers 
contain pictures that are graphic in nature, showing exposed genitalia and 







ages or consent; however, the persons depicted in the flyers reasonably strike 
the reader as minors.  
 Scenario 11: Same as Scenario 10, but instead of an unidentified man, it 
appears to be a representative from a theater, wearing an identification badge 
and collared shirt displaying the name of the theater. 
 Scenario 12: Still more flyers – the same as either Scenario 10 or 11, but the 
flyers explicitly advertise minors in the obscene depictions. 
 Scenario 13: Same as above, except there is a disclaimer at the bottom which 
states that the obscene depictions are not of actual minors, but instead of 
youthful-looking adults. 
 This discussion of harmful offenses is not to serve as an all-inclusive introduction 
to the proposed concept itself, but rather a taste of the entire “harmful offense to others” 
principle presented in Chapter 4. Each of the above scenarios depicts a situation of 
harmful offense that may not be criminalizable under Feinberg’s harm or offense 
principles; however, as readers, we generally accept some of these scenarios as 
legitimately criminalizable. These scenarios also exhibit varying ratios of setbacks to the 
two types of welfare interests required for a harmful offense. For example, Scenarios 4 
and 5 seem to constitute greater harm than Scenarios 2 and 3, whereas Scenario 12 seems 
to constitute greater offense than Scenario 8. 
 It may be useful to examine some of these scenarios in detail in order to 
understand how they constitute harmful offenses. Feinberg categorizes Scenario 1 as one 
of his stories of offense from his famous “ride on the bus.”
36
 However, a situation where 
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a corpse is subjected to a “series of hard hammer blows” is a situation of harmful offense, 
not of ‘pure’ Feinbergian offense. In light of Feinberg’s discussion on the plausibility of 
interests surviving post-mortem, the corpse-bashing not only offends the bus passengers, 




 Even though some of these scenarios (and other unlisted ones) may not clearly 
pass the harm or offense tests, our considered judgments may clearly convince us that 
some of these actions should be within the legitimacy of the criminal law. In order to 
extend the boundaries of the criminal law’s legitimacy, there must be a paramount, 
underlying rationale that would permit us to lower the threshold for legitimate 
criminalization in the case of harmful-offense. After all, there is the liberal presumption 
in favor of liberty that must be outweighed in order to criminalize acts legitimately. The 
question then becomes: what is specific to the nature of harmful offenses (which is not 
part of the nature of either pure harms or pure offenses) that overrides the weight of 
liberty on the other side of the scale? 
 There are two basic observations about the nature of harmful offenses that 
distinguish them from pure harms and pure offenses. The first observation involves an 
issue of privacy. In general, it is evident beyond elaboration that individuals in a liberal 
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state have a stake in basic privacy; broadly, privacy is construed as a welfare interest in 
excluding others from one’s personal domains (e.g., body, home).  In a reversed sense, 
privacy also involves a welfare interest in not being involuntarily included in the personal 
domains of others. So, in addition to a harmful setback of an individual’s welfare 
interests generally (possibly resulting in lost opportunities), harmful offenses compound 
the setback to welfare interests through a reverse-privacy violation. (A specific example 
of how harmful offenses can constitute a reverse-privacy violation will be discussed in 
chapter 7). 
 
Normative and Non-Normative Components  
 The second observation about the nature of harms, offenses, and any middle 
ground involves the normative status of its components.  It may be said that harms and 
offenses are constituted by differing combinations of two central, distinct components: 
normative and non-normative. The normative component refers to the sense in which the 
act is a wrong (e.g., violation of someone’s rights). The non-normative component refers 
to the sense in which the act is a setback to the welfare interests of the affected party. As 
Robert Amdur points out in “Harm, Offense, and the Limits of Liberty,” “the harm 
principle combines the key elements of both senses: to harm another person we must set 
back, thwart, or defeat his interests in a way that violates his right.”
38
 
 As part of the investigation into the relationship between harm and offense, it is 
useful to extend Amdur’s analysis of harm to the concepts of offense and harmful 
offense. As I have previously argued, offenses do involve the setback of a welfare interest 
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– the welfare interest in not being offended. In this sense, there is some strictly-semantic 
idea of a non-normative component. However, I would argue that offenses do not truly 
have such a non-normative component due to the nature of the welfare interest that they 
concern. The very nature of the welfare interest in not being offended is normative; it is 
defined by current and historical social conventions, the “felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories,” and experience.
39
 Ultimately, due to the very 
circumstantial nature of the welfare interest of which offense is concerned, offense does 
not have a wholly non-normative component.  
 Harmful offense, on the other hand, is amenable to a much more straightforward 
analysis. Since harmful offense includes acts that have a setback to welfare interests 
generally as well as a setback to the welfare interest in not being offended, harmful 
offense does have a truly non-normative component (i.e., the harm that the act produces). 
Harmful offense differs from pure offense in this key way; however, harmful offense’s 
components also differ from those of pure harm. Pure harm is composed of two equally-
weighted normative and non-normative components. Harmful offense – by contrast – 
while still containing a non-normative element – has a much larger normative component 
proportionate to its non-normative one. Harmful offense requires a similar seriousness of 
setbacks to welfare interests generally (non-normative) and setbacks to the welfare 
interest in not being offended (normative) as well as presupposing a wrong qua a 
violation of rights (normative).  
 This seems to make sense intuitively. Harmful offense includes examples of 
sexual harassment, stalking, offensive public displays where there is also a setback to 
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other welfare interests, and (as we shall see) some publicly-marketed, technologically-
advanced cases of animated child pornography. These examples involve a basic measure 
of non-normatively defined setbacks to welfare interests, but also rely heavily on the 
normatively-defined (1) system of legal rights and (2) the interest in not being offended. 
  
Revisiting Simester and von Hirsh’s Distinctions 
 In the introduction, I referred to Simester and von Hirsch’s distinctions between 
the effects of pure harms and pure offenses:  
 …[H]arm involves the impairment of a person’s opportunities to engage in 
 worthwhile activities and relationships and to pursue valuable, self-chosen goals. 
 In this sense, harm is prospective rather than backward-looking; it involves a 
 diminution of one’s opportunities to enjoy or pursue a good life. 
 
 By contrast, at least paradigmatically, offensive behavior does not reduce a 
 person’s opportunities or frustrate his goals. Rather, it causes the victim distress 
 without adversely affecting the sorts of interests that are the concern of the Harm 
 Principle. … In this sense, offense is experiential rather than forward-looking: the 
 affront suffered by V need not, though it may, suffer the cessation of the offensive 
 conduct. Hence offended states are not in themselves a harm, since they do not 
 necessarily imply any prospective loss of opportunity on the part of the victim. 




Simester and von Hirsch’s distinctions seem to conflict with the relationship between 
harm and offense as I have expounded it. They go on to argue that offenses cannot be 
prospective in the sense that they cannot set back any welfare interest; there exists no 
such welfare interest in not being offended because it is not an outcome in which 
someone has a stake and involves no “invest[ment of] some of one’s own good in it, thus 
assuming the risk of personal harm or setback.” In a similar fashion, they imply that, 
unlike offenses, harms cannot be experiential because they do not “come to us, are 
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 It is important to tread carefully here. Simester and von Hirsch’s distinctions 
(experiential vs. prospective), while useful for analyzing the general effects of harms and 
offenses, are predicated on a false assumption about the nature of setbacks to welfare 
interests. Simester and von Hirsch define a setback as the “diminution of one’s 
opportunities to enjoy or pursue a good life.”
42
 However, this definition of a setback is 
too narrow. Consider Feinberg’s example of a mere trespasser: 
 A trespasser invades the landowner’s interest in “the exclusive enjoyment and 
 possession of his land.” Technically that interest is violated when the trespasser 
 takes one quiet and unobserved step on the other’s land; in the somewhat special 
 sense of harm we have been developing, such a violation sets back an interest, and 
 to that extent therefore harms the interest’s owner, even though it does not harm 




Using Simester’s and von Hirsch’s definition of a setback, the mere trespasser’s 
unobserved steps onto the landowner’s property has not diminished his opportunities “to 
enjoy or pursue a good life” in any way.
44
 Thus, the “mere trespasser” wrongs the 
landowner, but does not setback any of his interests (and so the act is not a harm which 
can be addressed by the criminal law). However, this seems too reliant on the foreseeable 
negative consequences to one’s opportunities for prosperity; there are many scenarios 
where the violation may not produce a negative consequence upon one’s opportunities, 
but nonetheless still stands as a legitimate harm.
45
 Additionally, Simester and von 
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Hirsch’s use of setback implies that the landowner would not be harmed until he had 
knowledge of the trespass, as his opportunities for enjoying life would not diminish until 
he was aware of the trespass. As I have shown earlier in chapter 1, harms do not require 







Chapter 3: Considerations of Reasonableness 
 The first inconsistency we explored – Feinberg’s false dilemma of harm and 
offense – will be used in chapter 4 to develop a new principle for regulating harmful 
offenses. First, however, I turn to the second inconsistency within Feinberg’s model – his 
offense principle – which revolves around a failure to consider the reasonableness of the 
offender’s actions. He has neither “required that offenses be taken reasonably in order to 
qualify for legal intervention” nor included the “degree of reasonableness of an offense 
among the determents of its seriousness.”
46
 Additionally, Feinberg only considers the 
reasonableness of the offended party’s reaction through the four corresponding mediating 
maxims, but does not do so for the offender’s actions. This chapter will explain why a 
test of reasonableness is necessary for Feinberg’s offense principle and show how that 
test can be woven into a liberty-limiting principle, starting with David Shoemaker’s 
conception of reasonableness. 
 
Reasonableness vs. Rationality 
 It is imperative that the terms “rationality” and “reasonableness” are accurately 
defined. As Richard Arneson describes it in “Mill versus Paternalism,” rationality is an 
“economic value”; it is a value that we impose on our decisions in order to promote our 
own welfare interests.
47
 Rationality may be of two types. A person can be said to be 
competently (ir)rational if he is (un)able to make decisions that promote his own welfare 
interests (e.g., competent irrationality could be the result of a flaw in the design of his 
faculties). On the other hand, a prudentially (ir)rational person has the ability to make 
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decisions that promote his own welfare interests, but chooses otherwise (perhaps because 
his decisions are primarily based on the economic value of happiness, and the 
achievement of his own welfare interests are of little concern). Prudential rationality, as I 
have distinguished it here – is akin to prudential justification in epistemology, where 
subject S is prudentially justified if it is in S’s best interests to believe P. Simply put, a 
prudentially irrational person voluntarily makes decisions that are not in his best interests.  
 Reasonableness, on the other hand, is not an economic value, but rather a measure 
of consistency, coherence, and stability of a person’s belief-system and any arguments 
stemming from it. Reasonableness is also of two types: private (internal) and public 
(external). Privately (un)reasonableness refers to (in)consistency within an individual’s 
belief-system; for example, a person is privately unreasonable if they endorse both “A” 
and “not-A.” Public (un)reasonableness refers to (in)consistency between an individual’s 
belief-system and the foundational social values that cannot be erased without tearing the 
fabric of society itself (e.g., in the United States, basic equality and liberty). If a person 
makes arguments for state legislation based on a belief-system that is not consistent with 
that individual’s own freedom and equality (e.g., everyone should be his slave), then that 
person’s set of beliefs is publicly unreasonable. Although rationality is a related topic, 
Feinberg’s inconsistency results from his failure to use public reasonableness as a 











Public Reasonableness as an Extension of Rawls 
 The above definition of public reasonableness is not yet specific enough to 
develop a criterion for the offense principle, or to show even why one is necessary. The 
concept of reasonableness must be placed within the context of a liberal society in order 
for its relevance to be of any merit. Such a liberal society is most expansively defined by 
John Rawls, whose “well-ordered liberal society” is constructed of numerous, 
overlapping conceptions of the good (Rawls’ “comprehensive doctrines”).
48
















 Within this hypothetical overlapping consensus lies Rawlsian public reason – “the 
reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive 
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power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution.”
50
 Public 
reason is the liberal society’s requirement that citizens be able to “explain the basis of 
their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might 
endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.”
51
 
 The liberal society is one that values the guarantee of individual liberty and equal 
opportunity to pursue any “permissible” comprehensive doctrine.
52
 It is important to note 
that there are limits to which comprehensive doctrines an individual may permissibly 
pursue in the liberal state, and those arguments that citizens make “to pursue ends that 
transgress [these] limits have no weight.”
53
 These limits are imposed by the values of 
individual liberty and equal opportunity themselves because they form the foundation of 
the liberal state; any arguments stemming from comprehensive doctrines have no merit if 
they try to justify legislation that is inconsistent with the liberal state’s basic emphasis on 
individual liberty and equal opportunity. For example, consider the Slavist (a 
hypothetical diehard supporter of slavery) who adheres to a comprehensive doctrine that 
argues for legislation enslaving men to women from birth to death. Since the Slavist’s 
arguments and comprehensive doctrine are inconsistent with the liberal state’s values of 
equal opportunity and equal liberty, the Slavist’s comprehensive doctrine is excluded 
from the Rawlsian well-ordered society in the above figure. 
 As an extension of Rawlsian public reason, a comprehensive doctrine is publicly 
unreasonable if: 
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 …adherence to the doctrine requires one to be unwilling to propose and/or abide 
 by fair terms of cooperation with others from outside the doctrine, and then 




In staying aligned with the idea of public reason, Shoemaker claims that reasonable 
public justification for legitimate state coercion of liberty must: 
(1) adhere to basic standards of “ways of reasoning in general,” which includes 
inference to the best explanation, deductive principles of logic, logical validity 
and soundness, rules of evidence, and so forth; and, 
(2) be restricted to the “types of reasons that can be argued.” Reasonable 
justification for legitimate state limitations on liberty cannot appeal 
exclusively to an individual’s private comprehensive doctrine (e.g., 
Buddhism). Otherwise, such justification does not meet the demand of public 
reason that justification be endorsed by others as “consistent with their own 




Feinberg’s Rejection of Reasonableness 
 Feinberg explicitly states that his offense principle neither requires that “offenses 
be taken reasonably in order to qualify for legal intervention” nor include the “degree of 
reasonableness of an offense.”
56
 His offense principle rejects a public reasonableness 
requirement for two reasons. First, he states that the requirement is “redundant and 
unnecessary, given our endorsement of the extent of offense standard.”
57
 Since 
Feinberg’s balancing scales of maxims tend to prohibit only very widespread offenses, it 
would be very unlikely that actions causing only unreasonable offense will be prohibited. 
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It is highly unlikely that something could become offensive to a widespread number of 
people with “unreasonable dispositions.”
58
 Second, Feinberg’s account excludes 
consideration of the reasonableness of the offensive action because such a consideration 
would: 
 … require agencies of the state to make official judgments of the reasonableness 
 and unreasonableness of emotional states and sensibilities, in effect losing these 
 questions to dissent and putting the stamp of state approval on answers to 
 questions which, like issues of ideology and belief, should be left open to 




Feinberg is wary of a reasonableness condition that would grant the state authority to pass 
judgments on offended party’s reactions and individuals’ comprehensive doctrines, which 
would illiberally undermine the doctrine-neutral, liberal state. 
 
Why Reasonableness Is Necessary 
 As Shoemaker points out, Feinberg fails to distinguish among different referents 
of reasonableness in his rejection of such a condition. There are at least four different 
targets of reasonableness: 
 R1. the individual’s offended reaction itself 
 R2. the offended party’s reasons for “adhering to the general worldview that    
       underlies and gives rise to the offended reaction” 
 R3. the worldview itself 
 R4. the offended party’s justification(s) for legislation against the offending      
       action
60
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Consider staunch vegan Velma who lives adjacent to carnivorous Carl, who loves to hold 
weekly barbeques in his backyard. Velma is very offended by the wafting smell and sight 
of roasting chitterlings, whole chickens, and basted ribs, and so asks the local government 
to ban outdoor barbeques from the city. How would the four referents of reasonableness 
apply in the above example? 
 R1. Is it reasonable for Velma to be offended by Carl’s barbeques (given the  
       vegan worldview to which she adheres?) 
 R2. Is it reasonable for Velma to accept the vegan beliefs that underlie her      
       offended reaction? (i.e., Do Velma’s reasons for believing in a vegan         
       worldview withstand scrutiny?) 
 R3. Is veganism a reasonable framework? (i.e., Is it a logically consistent view of   
       the world?) 
 R4. Are Velma’s justification and arguments for state coercion against Carl  
        reasonable? (i.e., Do they meet the demands of Rawlsian public reason, as    
        outlined previously?) 
Feinberg rightly rejects reasonableness in order to avoid the state’s stamp on individual 
ideologies, and in doing so validly argues against reasonableness considerations of R1 
and R2. A liberal state should not endorse or interfere with its citizens’ liberties to hold 
any chosen framework of the world, making it illiberal for the state to judge the 
appropriateness of offended reactions that stem from those private worldviews. However, 
this leaves the question of R3 and R4. Shoemaker argues that both R3 and R4 are 
necessary thresholds for an offense principle in a liberal society. He goes on to explain 







stem) is “internally consistent, coherent, and stable.” R4 requires that justification for 
legitimate state coercion of liberty meet the demands of public reason. 
 Feinberg secondly rejects reasonableness on the grounds that widespread offenses 
that would tend to be prohibited by the offense principle would have to involve nearly all 
members of the offended party having an “unreasonable disposition.”
61
 Feinberg 
concludes that the “very unreasonableness of the reaction will tend to keep it from being 
sufficiently widespread to warrant preventive coercion.” However, history shows us 
otherwise. Consider periods of widespread offenses that resulted in state coercion where 
virtually all of the offended party had an unreasonable disposition –for example, 
interracial interactions between blacks and whites, Japanese internment camps, public 
expression between gay couples, sodomy laws, and Jews speaking to Germans. These are 
all cases of offensiveness that became widespread despite the apparent unreasonableness 
of the offended reaction, weakening Feinberg’s conclusion. Simester and von Hirsch 
even point out that: 
 On [Feinberg’s] view, the “reasonable avoidability” of the conduct weighs against 
 criminalization. Hence it ordinarily militates against criminalizing purportedly 
 offensive behavior conducted in private. But it is no absolute bar to criminalizing 
 such conduct; if sufficient numbers were upset by “the very thought” of the 




Additionally, Feinberg’s dependence on an unreasonable disposition only considers 
reasonableness vis-à-vis R1, and ignores the other possibilities (R2, R3, R4) to which 
reasonableness may refer.  
 Thus far our discussion has shown that reasonableness should not be rejected, but 
why must it be included as another test in the offense principle? Consider how Feinberg’s 
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offense principle – without a reasonableness condition - would legitimately prohibit an 
interracial couple from eating lunch together in a town of bigots, who are offended solely 
due to their racist beliefs (e.g., that races should not mix, etc.). The couple is sitting on a 
bench in the middle of a large public park surrounded by these bigots’ office buildings. 
Considerations on the side of the offending party include: 
 A1. Redeeming Social Value: The importance of the couple’s eating lunch     
        together is of moderate importance to the couple, and minimally important to    
        the society at-large. 
 A2. Alternative Opportunities: This couple could easily eat at a place and time   
        causing less (or no) offense to others (e.g., the privacy of a home, etc.) 
 A3. Motivation: The couple’s lunch is not a spitefully-motivated action intended  
        to irritate others. 
Considerations on the side of the offended party (the bigoted citizens walking through the 
park) include: 
 B1. Extent of Offense: The offense is widespread (given the couple’s location)   
       and moderately intense.  
 B2. Reasonable Avoidability: It would inconvenience the townspeople in their   
        window offices to avoid this sight.
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 B3. Foreseeable Risks: Going to one’s office and looking out the window can   
        hardly include the risk of seeing something that one might find offensive. 
 B4. Abnormal Sensibilities: The townspeople’s offended states are not due to any  
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 It could be argued that the townspeople could simply avert their eyes from this offensive sight; such a 
solution, however, would always result in an offense being reasonably avoidable, as all offended parties 
could just avert their gaze from the offending party’s conduct. This places too much of a burden on those 
who would be offended, requiring something of a Nietzschean “super will” to overcome a normal human 







        abnormal physical sensibilities. 
With the heavy weight now leaning against the offending party, Feinberg’s offense 
principle seems to justify the criminalization of the couple’s lunch. Fringe cases (like this 
one) that serve as counterexamples to Feinberg’s offense principle follow a similar logic, 
and point to the need for a reasonableness condition to prevent the illegitimate 
criminalization of widespread offenses. 
 
Formulating a Reasonableness Condition (RC) 
 In formulating a reasonableness requirement, or Reasonableness Condition (RC), 
we must first decide what referents of reasonableness should be included. R1 and R2, as 
shown earlier, should not be included due to their illiberal consequences of the state’s 
endorsement of particular comprehensive doctrines. R3 – the internal consistency, 
stability, and coherency of a comprehensive doctrine – and R4 – justification adhering to 
the demands of public reason – are the other two possibilities. Shoemaker argues that 
both R3 and R4 should serve as components of a Reasonableness Condition (RC). He 
states that considerations of R3 should be used by the state to legitimately “ignore the 
complaints of adherents based on tenets of comprehensive doctrines that are internally 
inconsistent, incoherent, or unstable.”
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 This seems illiberal – a comprehensive doctrine 
that has the characteristics of internal inconsistency or instability could be the result of 
either a privately unreasonable or irrational lifestyle. A liberal state should not impose the 
value of rationality on individuals’ comprehensive doctrines; doing so illiberally endorses 
a particular type of comprehensive doctrine to begin with. People in a liberal society 
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should have the liberty to hold rational or irrational belief systems. Richard Arneson 
states that rationality itself is an economic value and that liberal states should “be 
prepared to tolerate deviations from rationality that occur through a person’s exercise of 
autonomous choice.”
65
 The assumption that each individual desires to rationally 
maximize his own ends illiberally imposes that economic value of rationality on their 
lives. 
 That leaves us with considerations of R4 – mandating that the justification for 
legitimate criminalization must be reasonable by meeting the demands of public reason. 
Reasonableness with respect to public argumentation is a valid liberal requirement; 
without this consensus, public discussion and justifications for the criminal law would 
become aimless and incoherent, as there would be few (if any) criteria and rules of 
discussion.
66
 Using R4 and the idea of public reason, the Reasonableness Condition can 
be formulated as follows: 
 RC: When one offers justification for state coercion of offenses, the justification  
 must be reasonable; that is, it must meet the demands of Rawlsian public reasons. 
 Public justifications should be considered weightless if: 
(a) they originate solely in private comprehensive doctrines that could not be 
endorsed by all other reasonable citizens consistent with their own freedom 
and equality; or 
(b) they do not follow basic logical rules for argumentation, i.e., rules of 
evidence, principles of inferences and intuition, the law of non-contradiction, 




Using the RC as primary test for the offense principle corrects the problem we find with 
the earlier counterexample to Feinberg’s model of an interracial couple having lunch. 
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Before considering the scales of mediating maxims, arguments for criminalization of this 
couple’s interracial activities would be subject to the RC. However, the offended party’s 
arguments (e.g., the bigot townspeople’s) against the interracial couple’s public lunch 
would clearly violate the RC. The racists might argue that the couple’s activity offends 
them because it exemplifies a mixing of the races that the racists find highly offensive 
(because it is immoral, sinful, etc.). However, this would be considered a weightless 
argument in the public domain under provision (a) of the RC; the racists’ arguments for 
criminalizing the couple’s lunch would fail to meet the demands of public reason. It 
would be inconsistent for the townspeople to argue from this private comprehensive 
doctrine (where interracial mixing is immoral) because it cannot be endorsed by all other 
reasonable citizens and remain consistent with their own freedom and equality. In 
essence, the racists’ arguments for criminalization violate the very individual liberty and 
equality that any comprehensive doctrine must endorse in a liberal society. In this 
manner, the Reasonableness Condition can apply considerations of reasonableness 
without warranting an illiberal judgment by the state, as Feinberg was so concerned 
about. 
 The Reasonableness Condition should fit into Feinberg’s existing offense 
principle by serving as a primary test or threshold that all argumentation for criminal 
legislation should pass before being subject to the mediating maxims. These revisions to 




















































** In Chapter 4, an argument is made for rejecting motivation as a mediating maxim of offensiveness. 
Reasonableness Condition 
 
(1) originate solely in private 
comprehensive doctrines that 
could not be endorsed by all 
other reasonable citizens 
consistent with their own 
freedom and equality; or 
(2) do not follow basic logical 
rules for argumentation, i.e., 
rules of evidence, principles of 
inference and intuition, and 
other agreed-upon ways of 
reasoning. 
Public justifications for state 
legislation are considered weightless 
if they: 
Feinberg’s Balancing of Maxims 
 
Maxims for Offender: 
 
1. Personal and social 
importance of offense  
 
2. Possibility that offense could 
have been performed 
elsewhere, causing less or no 
offense 
 
(3. To what extent the offense 
is motivated by spite.)** 
Maxims for Offended: 
 
1. Extent of Offense 
 
2. Reasonable Avoidability 
 
3. Volenti maxim 
 
4. Whether offended states 
are due to abnormal 
sensibilities of the person. 









The Priority of the Reasonableness Condition 
 
 The above diagram raises a final question for the reader. In our procedure of 
analyzing claims for state legislation, why should the Reasonableness Condition have 
priority over the balancing of mediating maxims? I offer three sets of arguments in 
support of its priority. 
 First, the Reasonableness Condition is a basic requirement of all arguments for 
legislation and a more objective test than the balancing of mediating maxims. The scales 
of mediating maxims will unavoidably depend - to some degree - on the legislator, judge, 
or citizen doing the balancing. There are difficult scenarios where reasonable people will 
reasonably disagree on how the mediating maxims balance, and that limit on balancing 
models is a necessary frustration for the liberal state. However, the requirement of public 
reasonableness is not a criterion which will rely on its user’s ability to balance scales, but 
instead is dictated by logic and an ability to decipher the legislation’s implications. If X is 
legislation that implies or results in Y, and Y is inconsistent with equal opportunity to 
pursue permissible comprehensive doctrines, then the liberal state cannot endorse X 
because it is publicly unreasonable.  
 Second, the priority of the Reasonableness Condition corrects serious flaws in 
Feinberg’s analysis of offenses, whereby a widespread offended reaction in the majority 
can overrule the liberty of a minority. The earlier counterexample to Feinberg’s original 
offense principle – the townspeople wanting to criminalize an interracial couple’s 
publicly eating lunch – exemplifies the problem with widespread offended reactions. By 







Condition moves the offense principle closer to being fundamentally fair in a liberal state, 
and away from depending on the subjectivity of balancing tests to determine outcomes. 
 Third (and most importantly), the subordinance of the mediating maxims to the 
Reasonableness Condition equalizes the reasonableness of the maxims. Before the 
inclusion of the Reasonableness Condition, Feinberg excluded the reasonableness of an 
offending party’s conduct as a criterion, but included reasonableness with regard to the 
offended party’s reaction. The maxims related to the offending party’s conduct were 
given less practical weight than the offended party’s reaction by this exclusion; as a 
result, counterexamples (like the one of an interracial couple having lunch in public) tend 
to favor the offended party (and thus favor criminalization or legislation). Clearly, in the 
liberal society, the presumption is in favor of liberty and equal opportunity – not in favor 
of criminalizing individual behavior. The Reasonableness Condition effectively applies 
public reasonableness as a criterion to both sets of maxims (the offending party and the 








Chapter 4: The Harmful Offense Principle 
  
 Having shown that there exists a middle ground of criminalizable actions between 
those that are harmful and those that cause offense, I now set out to design a principle to 
demarcate the legitimate bounds of state intervention within this middle ground. In its 
simplest form, the harmful offense principle states that those actions which cause 
substantial harmful offense to others can be legitimately restricted by the state. I will use 
the two inconsistencies that were resolved and strengthened in chapters 2 and 3 in order  
to weave together the harmful offense principle and its mediating maxims. 
 
Mediating Maxims of Harmful Offense Principle 
 
 It is not practical simply to state that “those actions which cause substantial 
harmful offense to others can be legitimately restricted by the state”; this is a statement of 
mere surplusage, devoid of useful content. To develop a pragmatic, guiding principle for 
legislators, it is necessary that circumstantial factors be considered (e.g., factors akin to 
Feinberg’s mediating maxims). I will first start with Feinberg’s mediating maxims for 
both the harm and offense principles and analyze each within the context of combined 
harmful offense. Those considerations that logically apply to both harm and offense will 
be retained and tested against our considered judgments and example cases, whereas 
those that are non-sequiturs to harmful offense will be discarded.  
 In order for a maxim to “logically apply,” it must further our knowledge about the 
ultimate wrongness involved in the given act. In the case of harmful offense, I established 
that the ultimate wrongness involved in harmful offense was the resulting infringement to 
two kinds of welfare interests: (G) general welfare interests, and (O) the specific welfare 







they must further our understanding of a given act’s infringement on these two kinds of 
welfare interests. For each maxim, I will use a combination of examples and theory to 
answer the following question: does this particular maxim provide relevant information 
to discern the type and degree of the particular welfare interests that are setback? 
 
From the harm principle only: 
De minimis maxim 
 
 Although it is not mentioned as a mediating maxim in the revised offense 
principle, the de minimis maxim is inherent in our definition of offenses. The very 
definition of offenses is so narrowly tailored as to exclude offenses of bare knowledge 
and those that fail the Reasonableness Condition. It is sensible, then, to apply the de 
minimis maxim to harmful offense, thereby excluding trivial or minor harmful offenses 
that the legislative and judicial systems are practically ill-equipped to handle.  
 
Risk = gravity * probability 
 
 Risk is a necessary factor in determining whether a harmful offense is within the 
legitimate scope of the criminal law. Consider its role in cases of pure harm. A significant 
percentage of those acts which the state punishes (and seems to do so legitimately) turn 
on the probability and gravity of the act. For example, direct threats towards an 
individual’s physical well-being are legitimately restricted by the government. Although 
the probability of a threat being carried out varies with each individual situation, the 
gravity of harm to the individual raises the risk of such threats to a level that is within the 
scope of the criminal law. 
 There is no difference in the case of harmful offenses; the risk of uncertain 







victimized party’s welfare interests. If Mary makes personally-threatening, graphically 
sexual comments to Susan, then Mary’s harmful offense can be legitimately restricted or 
punished by the criminal law. Though we may not know the certainty of the act’s 
occurrence, the act’s gravity is sufficiently high as to warrant an investigation into its 
probability of occurring. This formula operates on a sliding scale. As the probability of 
the act becomes more likely (e.g., in the case of Mary’s verbal threats), then the requisite 
gravity decreases to establish a legitimate cause for restriction (and vice versa). As the 
probability becomes less likely (e.g., in the case of Mary’s poor attempt at nervous 
humor), then the requisite gravity increases to establish a legitimate cause for state 
coercion (and vice versa). 
 
From the offense principle only: 
Redeeming social value 
 
 Although redeeming social value is a consideration central to Feinberg’s offense 
principle, it remains to be seen whether an act’s social value could justify a situation of 
harmful offense. Using the example of Scenario 1: 
Scenario 1: A group of mourners carrying a coffin sit in the park along your direct 
route. Their demeanor, however, is “by no means funereal. In fact they seem more 
angry than sorrowful, and refer to the deceased as ‘the old bastard,’ and ‘the 
bloody corpse.’ At one point they rip open the coffin with hammers and proceed 




This act could be legitimately punished and prohibited under the offense principle (as 
explained on page 23). Yet imagine a similar situation where the mourners are dressed as 
Uncle Sam, the body is of a fallen soldier, and they do so while chanting an anti-war 
slogan. The value of their speech can serve as a factor for determining the act’s balance 
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between liberty and the infringement of others’ welfare interests (in this case, harmful 
offense). For example, does the social value of their free speech in protesting the war 
provide them with an exception to punishment? Due to the great personal harm involved, 
I would argue ‘no’; free speech, while almost universally protected, can be limited due to 
the manner in which it is expressed.  
 There are other situations where social value as a consideration can illuminate the 
balance between liberty and any resulting harmful offense. If the body was instead a 
lifelike replica of a specifically-identified, fallen soldier (and all other details of the 
scenario remained equivalent), the social value of the mourner’s protest could then 
outweigh the harm done to the soldier. In this case, the harmful offense that occurs – the 
harm to the soldier (e.g., a damaged reputation) – and the offense to others (e.g., the 
public display of a realistic bodily mutilation) is mitigated by the social value of free 
speech. Any punishment, in this scenario, would depend upon how extensive the harmful 
offense is – whether this was a single or repeated act, how negatively the soldier’s 




Alternate opportunities (and reasonable avoidability) 
 
 Although it is sensible to speak of relocating offenses to another place, time, or 
manner where they could be less offensive and more acceptable (e.g., restricting nudity to 
one’s home), requiring the same for harms is nonsensical. The circumstantial nature of 
offenses is an essential property of offenses alone. Offenses can be relocated in time, 
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place, and manner precisely because their resulting infringement on another’s right 
changes in accord with changes in such circumstances. It is hardly offensive to have sex 
in the privacy of one’s home, whereas (arguably) doing the same in public is greatly 
offensive in some cultures.  
 However, harms do not have this defining circumstantial nature; instead, harms 
tend to be universal and static. John is harmed to a similar degree despite the contextual 
circumstances - whether Alex knifed in public, at night, or in China. In a similar way, it is 
nonsensical to speak of reasonably avoiding harms. A harm’s infringement on someone’s 
welfare interests and resulting rights is not mitigated if John walked through a violent 
urban area rather than driving through a less violent neighborhood. The chances of a 
harm occurring might differ, but the harm’s infringement on John’s liberty and rights is 
equivalent. For these reasons, it is reasonable to exclude reasonable avoidance and 
alternate opportunities from our list of considerations for the harmful offense principle. 
 
Spiteful Motivation 
 Although Feinberg considers whether the offending party was motivated by spite, 
there is good reason to disagree with his assumption. Feinberg states that “wholly spiteful 
conduct, done with the intention of offending and for no other reason, is wholly 
unreasonable.”
70
 He also clearly believes that: 
 By and large the offending person’s motives are his own business, and the law 
 should respect them whatever they are. But when the motive is merely malicious 
 or spiteful it deserves no respect at all. Offending the senses or sensibilities of 
 others simply for the sake of doing so is hardly less unreasonable than harming 
 the interests of others simply for the sake of doing so.
71
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 We need only examine a relevant example to see why motivation as a mediating 
maxim fails; ultimately, in a pluralist society, motivation as a mediating maxim veils the 
legislation of a single comprehensive doctrine to the detriment of others. This is evident 
in Feinberg’s comment that a malicious or spiteful motive “deserves no respect at all.” 
Consider the facts of Cohen v. California (1971). Cohen peacefully and quietly wore a 
jacket containing the written statement “Fuck the draft” into a Los Angeles courthouse. 
The offense (or lack thereof) of Cohen’s jacket does not depend on Cohen’s intentions, 
but rather on the actual act itself. Certainly his jacket does not infringe others’ welfare 
interest (in not being offended) in a greater way if his motivation was spiteful towards the 
court or towards a specific individual. In other words, his jacket does not become more 
offensive if his motivation for wearing the jacket was spiteful (and his jacket does not 
become less offensive if he intended to display a political statement regarding 
conscription) because the nature of an offense does not turn on the actor’s intentions. As 
a result, motivation should not be used as a mediating factor to determine whether a 
potentially offensive action falls within the realm of legitimate criminalization. 
 
Extent (intensity, duration, scope of effect) 
 
 The extent of a harmful offense is directly related to its degree of infringement to 
others’ two-fold welfare interests. The more intense, the longer lasting, and the more 
widespread a harmful offense, the more likely that it infringes a greater number of 
people’s welfare interests more negatively. Conversely, the less intense, the shorter, and 
the less widespread a harmful offense, the more likely that the act infringes a lesser 







harmful offense, the more legitimate its restriction. (This does not preclude a harmful 
offense from being restricted by the government if the victimized party is only one 
individual, but rather requires that the act’s other effects – its risk, duration, intensity, etc. 




Volenti maxim and abnormal susceptibilities / sensibilities 
 
 Just as in the cases of the offense and harm principles, the Volenti maxim and 
abnormal susceptibilities / sensibilities are informative as to the degree of an act’s 
violations of others’ two-fold welfare interests. If one has an interest in not being 
offended or harmed – and yet fully consents to a given act – any complaint that individual 
lodges for legitimate state intervention has been void. The same holds for a harmful 
offense as well. If our workplace harasser Mary makes verbally forcible, sexual advances 
towards Susan, and Susan fully consents to them insofar as she reciprocates the advances, 
Susan has no claim against Mary for any harmful offense. (This is not to say that Susan 
has no recourse of any kind; if Susan playfully returns Mary’s advances, but then ceases 
her consent once Susan becomes too threatening, then Mary has a legitimate claim 
against Susan’s sexual harassment.)
72
 
 In a similar manner, abnormal sensibilities of the affected party afford no weight 
to the complainant’s arguments for state intervention. If John is particularly vulnerable to 
the Portuguese language and finds it sexually threatening (say, due to its sensual tones), 
we cannot make the speaking of Portuguese a criminal offense simply because a minority 
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(or majority, for that matter) of the population is particularly vulnerable for it.
73
 As 
Feinberg points out: 
 Unlike special vulnerabilities to harm, however, abnormal susceptibilities to 
 offense find more appropriate legal protection against malicious exploitation 
 through means other than the criminal law, for example, through injunctions, civil 




Now that we have sorted the basic mediating maxims of the harmful offense principle, it 
is important to see how all of these maxims, definitions, and conditions interact within 
the broader application of the principle:  
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(1) originate solely in private 
comprehensive doctrines that 
could not be endorsed by all 
other reasonable citizens 
consistent with their own 
freedom and equality; or 
(2) do not follow basic logical 
rules for argumentation, i.e., 
rules of evidence, principles of 
inference and intuition, and 
other agreed-upon ways of 
reasoning. 
Public justifications for state 
legislation are considered weightless 
if they: 
Balancing of Maxims 
 
Maxims for Offending Party: 
 
1. De minimis maxim (triviality 
of harmful offense) 
 
2. Risk of harmful offense 
(gravity * probability) 
 
3. Personal and social value of 
conduct 
Maxims for Affected Party: 
 
1. Extent of harmful offense 
(intensity, duration, and scope) 
 
2. Volenti maxim 
 
3. Whether setbacks to either 
welfare interests generally or in 
not enduring offended states are 
due to the abnormal sensibilities 
of the person. 
Party requests state 
legislation / 
restrictions against 
a harmful offense. 
Requirements of Harmful Offense: 
(1) acts or omissions of an act 
(2) that are wrongful 
(3) setbacks of 
(4) two kinds of welfare interests: 
(G) the general welfare interests   
 (element of harmfulness, e.g., 
 bodily autonomy, security of self, 
 etc.), and 
(O) the specific welfare interest in 
 not being offended (element of 
 offensiveness) 









The Need for a Separate Harmful Offense Principle 
 
 The natural question is why a harmful offense principle is necessary, and why 
existing harm and offense principles could not shoulder the burden of acts that fall into 
this middle ground. To see why the harm and offense principles fail to mediate these acts, 
consider an example of sexual harassment in the workplace involving acquaintances Boss 
Bob and Secretary Sue. 
 If Bob is naturally aggressive and interested in Sue, it is very plausible that Bob 
might approach Sue with what he considers a compliment – e.g., by commenting on her 
body. Although Bob makes the comment in an aggressively flirtatious manner, Sue is 
offended and her workplace autonomy is setback (however slightly) by his verbal 
aggression. The harm principle could conceivably allow punishment of this incident due 
to its failure to consider the largely normative nature of the incident. In other words, the 
harm principle does not consider that there may be some overriding contextual 
considerations of the incident – e.g., the personal importance of Bob’s way of flirting to 
his dating lifestyle, the extent (duration, intensity, and scope) of the harmful offense, etc.  
Overall, the harm principle fails to mediate appropriately acts of harmful offense because 
it is too restrictive on individual liberty. Due to the highly normative nature of harmful 
offenses established in chapter 2, any principle that analyzes such acts must involve 
considerations of the personal / social value and extent of the acting party’s conduct. If 
used to analyze harmful offenses, the harm principle would effectively use non-normative 
maxims to examine largely normative acts.
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 What if Bob instead comes into the office every day and makes loud, sexually-
graphic comments that are not physically directed to Sue or any other individual, but 
which discuss raping women in general? The offense principle might fail to criminalize 
such blatant sexual harassment because (1) the speech could be considered the exposition 
of ideas, thus protecting it as personally and socially important, and (2) the offense 
principle is not concerned with the setbacks to any female coworkers’ personal autonomy 
(e.g., harm) that result from the hostile workplace environment. An analysis under the 
offense principle fails due to its inability to consider appropriately the non-normative 
component of harmful offense – the fact that there are setbacks to other welfare interests 
(besides the specific interest in not being offended). The failures of the harm and offense 
principles to precisely analyze harmful offenses points to the need for a separate harmful 
offense principle. 
 
Criticisms and Responses  
 
 Nietzscheans reading this principle might protest at the sight of these “mediating 
maxims,” arguing that they are methods of hiding one’s own morality behind the forms 
of theoretical abstraction.
76
 Certainly other philosophers have criticized Feinberg in this 
regard, claiming that his maxims are morally-based, even though Feinberg explicitly 
rejects the use of any presupposed moral system. Since the harmful offense principle 
requires an acceptance of Feinberg’s basic arguments for the harm and offense principles, 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship), then this is a problem for the harm principle as well. As discussed earlier, the harm principle 
must afford some weight to abnormal susceptibilities (e.g., a person with hemophilia, blindness, deafness, 
etc.). In doing so would have to afford some weight to Sue’s particular vulnerabilities. 
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the mediating maxims of the harmful offense principle are also subject to this same 
Nietzschean criticism.  
 However, I would argue that the maxims are not grounded in any one personal 
bias or morality, but instead are pragmatic factors used to determine the line between 
individual liberty and infringements into others’ welfare interests. They are empirical 
considerations that can be used to advance our knowledge of an act’s consequences on 
others’ rights and welfare interests. As such, these maxims must relay information about 
external considerations of the context of a given act. Considering such external 
information is not only amoral, but necessarily pragmatic to transcend abstraction and 
make the harm, offense, and harmful offense principles useful to statesmen. 
 Perhaps Nietzsche would not object to an inclusion of the maxims themselves, but 
instead to the way Feinberg selects the relevant maxims, and here I do not disagree. 
Feinberg borrows and transforms his maxims from long-held traditions of common law 
and U.S. tort (personal injury) law. He does not seem to analyze whether his maxims are 
related to furthering our knowledge of an act’s impact on others’ rights and welfare 
interests. This is where my method differs, and why I exclude “spiteful motivation” as a 
maxim – for it does not help us know whether a given act results in a greater or lesser 
infringement of another’s welfare interests. 
 Another criticism revolves around our formulation of a reasonableness criterion. 
In “Coercive Restraint of Offensive Actions,” Donald VanDeVeer considers and rejects 
such a criterion, after analogizing the states of persons “offended unreasonably” of those 
physically distraught states of an allergy sufferer: 
 Such a standard gives “no weight” as it were to distresses associated not just with 







 difficulty with this principle would be sorting reasonable and unreasonable 
 beliefs. Let us assume the beliefs are “evidently irrational.”…My analogous case 
 is that of persons suffering from severe allergies. Allergic persons are vulnerable 
 to severe distress and suffer it when “in touch with” what are, for most, innocuous 
 substances…Must we cater to these eccentric sensibilities? The answer is: of 
 course – to some extent…Similarly, the vulnerabilities to distress of those with 
 even downright irrational beliefs or bizarre sensibilities cannot be disregarded…A 
 principle of offense which gave no consideration to bizarre sensibilities or beliefs 
 would, for reasons suggested, be indefensible. Hence, the Reasonableness 




 Essentially, VanDeVeer argues that some weight should be given to unreasonable 
arguments for state intervention against certain offensive (or harmfully offensive) acts.
78
  
By contrast, the Reasonableness Condition developed in chapter 3 gives no weight to 
publicly unreasonable justifications. There are two problems with VanDeVeer’s 
suggestion. First, VanDeVeer conflates a reaction due to “bizarre sensibilities” and a 
reaction that is “statistically normal but [still] unreasonable.”
79
 Individuals with particular 
vulnerabilities (“bizarre sensibilities”) are not necessarily “evidently irrational,” as 
VanDeVeer assumes. Using the distinction between rationality and reasonableness laid 
out in chapter 3, an individual may have a very (prudentially) rational yet highly 
unreasonable belief. It may be prudentially rational for John to be offended by 
pornography because it is an effective way to achieve some specific end (e.g., to appear 
modest in front of women), but John’s belief may be privately unreasonable because it is 
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 Shoemaker, “‘Dirty Words’ and the Offense Principle,” p. 562. 
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 Shoemaker offers another reason why VanDeVeer’s above analysis is flawed. 
Shoemaker draws an important distinction between VanDeVeer’s allergy analogy and 
offended reactions:  
 …many offended reactions are either reasonable or unreasonable, whereas 
 allergic reactions are neither. The negative normative assessment we may 
 coherently make with regard to certain offended reactions – “You shouldn’t be 
 offended by such things” – quite simply cannot sensibly be made to someone 
 suffering from a severe allergic reaction. For example, it would be nonsensical to 




As such, the analogy fails to hold, and the Reasonableness Condition will give no weight 
to any claims resulting from publicly unreasonable arguments for legislation against 
harmfully offensive (or purely offensive) acts. 
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Chapter 5: Summary 
 Before applying the harmful offense principle to a particular case, I offer a 
summary of what I have argued in Part I.  
 Offensiveness is neither a disparate concept nor a subset of harmfulness. Instead, 
offense and harm have related properties. They are both wrongful setbacks to welfare 
interests, but the kind of welfare interest with which each is concerned differs 
according to its normative status. Harms involve setbacks to non-normatively-defined 
welfare interests generally (other than the interest in not being offended), whereas 
offenses involve setbacks to the normatively-defined welfare interest in not being 
offended. This relationship of harm and offense produces a spectrum, along which 
wrongful setbacks to welfare interests vary by the degree to which they are 
normatively-defined.  
 Rationality is an economic value that we may impose on our lives in order to achieve 
best our own interests and goals. If an individual lacks the mental faculties to choose 
the best way to achieve his own interests, that person is competently irrational; an 
individual who has the ability to make decisions that best further his own goals, but 
voluntarily rejects rationality as a value, is said to be prudentially irrational. 
Contrarily, reasonableness is not an economic value, but instead the measure of an 
argument’s or comprehensive doctrine’s consistency, either internally (private 
reasonableness) or externally (public reasonableness). The addition of a 
Reasonableness Condition to the offense principle is necessary to prevent widespread 
offenses from being criminalized due to an imbalance in the mediating maxims of 







 Harmful offense is a product of this gradient, and includes a narrow class of acts that 
include both substantial harm and offense. A new principle and mediating maxims are 
required to determine whether a given harmful offense is within the legitimate scope 
of the criminal law. There may be other mediating maxims and practical 
considerations that legislators and social scientists find reasonable to include in the 
harmful offense principle, but the ones I have expounded are the minimum necessary 
for the principle’s effectiveness. 
 Arguments are not made for the general acceptance of this proposed relationship 
between harm and offense and for the existence of harmful offense independently of 
Feinberg’s harm and offense principles. Instead, accepting the proposed relationship 
of harm and offense (as well as the resulting harmful offense principle) requires an 
acceptance of the liberal position, defined by the use of the harm and offense 
principles. (If the reader instead subscribes to the sovereignty principle and rejects the 
use of harm and offense in determining the scope of the criminal law, then I cannot 































Chapter 6: Background 
 
 Part II is an application of the theoretical arguments and principles established in 
Part I to a contemporary legal case. In Part II, I analyze the current legal dilemma 
surrounding the criminalization of virtual- and youthful-looking child pornography, using 
the harmful offense principle to determine whether the “new” wave of child pornography 
falls within the legitimate scope of the criminal law. Before doing so, however, a certain 
amount of historical and legal background concerning the treatment of freedom of 
speech, freedom of expression, and obscenity is necessary. 
 
Free Speech and the First Amendment 
  
  The First Amendment states that: 
 
  Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
 prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
 press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 




It is well known that the First Amendment establishes freedom of speech, and that 
freedom of speech is not restricted to merely spoken and written words. Under historical 
interpretation, freedom of speech constitutes freedom of expression, including spoken 
and written words, purely symbolic speech (e.g., flag-burning), individual or group 
behavior, works of art, images and photographs, movies and theater performances, and 
video games. The First Amendment, however, has not been interpreted as an individual’s 
carte blanche to express oneself in any manner, and so not all conduct expressing speech 
(i.e., the behavioral manners by which speech is expressed) are protected by the 
amendment. Most notably, general examples of unprotected speech include libel or 
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slander, threats or so-called “fighting words,” behavior or speech that results in direct 
obstruction of justice, harassment, and obscenity. It is this last category – obscenity – on 
which my challenge to the Supreme Court will focus. Specifically, this challenge is to its 
2002 decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition which effectively legalized both 
virtual child pornography and youthful-looking adult pornography that is marketed as 
child pornography. 
 The Supreme Court has long held that obscenity is not a protected form of 
expression, mainly due to its lack of expressing any coherent speech: 
 There are certain well-defined and narrowly-limited classes of speech, the 
 prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
 Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene…[S]uch utterances 
 are of no essential part of the exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
 value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 





Miller v. California (1973) 
 
 Defining what constitutes obscenity, however, is a problem unto itself. In 1973 in 
Miller v. California, the Court drafted its current version of obscenity tests – those 
requisite criteria which speech must meet in order to be criminalized. In order to 
criminalize speech as obscene, the Miller tests require that the speech must:
84
 
(1) appeal “strictly to a prurient interest”; 
(2) depict sexually explicit conduct “in a patently offensive way”; and, 
(3) (as a whole) must “lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 
([S]LAPS test) 
 
If all three criteria are satisfied, then the speech constitutes obscenity (and is thus 
unprotected by the First Amendment). In (1) and (2), “contemporary community 
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standards” (rather than national standards) are given the weight of judgment to determine 
if speech either appeals “strictly to a prurient interest” or depicts sexually explicit 
conduct “in a patently offensive way.”
85
 Additionally, unlike earlier obscenity tests, the 
judgment of a “reasonable” or “average” person (rather than the most sensitive person in 
the community) is used to make determinations of (1), (2), or (3).
86
 
 It is important to note that the Miller test cannot be used to criminalize the mere 
private possession of obscene speech (e.g., in one’s own home), but rather the buying, 
selling, or distribution of such speech in the public sphere. The Court essentially held that 
the First Amendment grants a constitutionally-protected right merely to possess adult 
pornography within the privacy of one’s home, but that there is no constitutional right to 




New York v. Ferber (1982) 
 
 Following the establishment of the three-pronged Miller test, the Court considered 
the relationship of child pornography to the Miller test in New York v. Ferber in 1982. 
The Ferber Court categorized child pornography – where there is any depiction of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit action – as an exception to the Miller test. This ruling 
criminalized child pornography altogether, whether or not an argument could be made for 
its not satisfying the Miller test of obscenity. Prior to this ruling, if an argument could be 
made for some child pornography having a serious artistic value, then those cases of child 




 Ibid., p. 24. 
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pornography would not be criminalized as obscene (for failing to satisfy (3) of the Miller 
test). After this ruling, the private possession, distribution, buying, or selling of child 
pornography was criminalized outright (without any consideration of its satisfying the 
Miller test).
88
 In other words, child pornography does not need to be legally obscene 
under Miller in order to be banned (because it is obscene per se). 
 In its ruling, the Court determined that the state had a compelling interest in 
preventing the sexual exploitation of children, and that the private possession of child 
pornography (involving minors engaged in sexual activity) was “intrinsically related” to 
the sexual abuse of children.
89
 The distribution of child pornography through buying, 
selling, and advertising provided an economic motive for producing child pornography, 
and is also intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children. As a side note, the Court 
also found that child pornography has negligible, if any, artistic value. As a result, the 
Court held that child pornography does not receive First Amendment protection and that 




Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 
 
 In 2002 in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck down two 
parts of the 1996 Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) that expanded the scope of 
the definition of criminalized child pornography. Prior to the CPPA, child pornography 
was recognized by the Ferber Court as “sexually explicit images involving real minors as 
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(1) any visual depiction that is or appears to be of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; 
(2) any sexually explicit image produced through computer morphing;93 or, 
(3) any sexually explicit image that is advertised in such a manner so as to convey 
the impression that a minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
 
In Ashcroft, only (1) and (3) were challenged as to their constitutionality.
94
 The Court 
found that (1) and (3) could apply to both virtual child pornography (where the images 
use no real actors), and youthful-looking adult pornography that is presented as or 
strongly suggestive of using child actors. Since the CPPA could prohibit child 
pornography that does not depict an actual child actor, the majority opinion wrote that 
these two statutes of the CPPA could not be upheld under the reasoning of Ferber. 
 The primary question before the Court became whether these two categories – 
images that “appear to be” or “are pandered as” child pornography – are constitutional 
since they possibly prohibit a realm of speech that is neither obscene (under the Miller 
tests) nor actual child pornography (under Ferber).
95
 In its decision the Court struck 
down these two prohibitive statutes of the CPPA, ruling that both were unconstitutional 
because they were overbroad and might apply to (and thus ban) a substantial realm of 
valid speech. For example, the Court feared the application of these statutes in banning 
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contemporary Hollywood movies (such as “Traffic” or “American Beauty”) or 
Shakespearean plays that graphically “give the impression” of minors engaging in sex.
96
 
 The Court’s secondary reasoning for allowing virtual child pornography and 
youthful-looking adult porn that is pandered as child porn (hereafter referred to as 
“youthful-looking child pornography”) rests on the claim that no sufficient harm is done 
to any child actors. Under Ferber, the Court automatically criminalized child 
pornography because of “the State’s interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors.”
97
 However, the Court reasoned that due to the lack 
of any actual child actors in either virtual or youthful-looking child pornography, there 
can be no harm to any minors. As a result, the Court concluded that there was no legal 
support under Ferber in banning either virtual or youthful-looking child pornography, 
and struck down the two statutes.  
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Chapter 7: Application of a Harmful Offense Analysis 
 
 This chapter will be devoted to examining Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
case of virtual and youthful-looking child pornography. I will first show what reasons can 
be given for the criminalization of distributing such child pornography through the use of 
the harmful offense principle. Then I will explain how the Court’s reasoning is 
inconsistent with its precedent cases and why there is good reason to doubt the justice’s 
stated reasons for not criminalizing the public distribution of such child pornography.  
 
An Analysis of the Harmful Offense Involved 
 I will limit my application of the harmful offense principle and later analysis to 
the public distribution, advertising, buying, and selling of these new types of child 
pornography.
98
 The public distribution of virtual and youthful-looking child pornography 
falls within the scope of harmful offense (and neither pure harm nor pure offense alone). 
The distribution of such child pornography is: 
(1) an act 
(2) that is a wrongful 
(3) setback to 
(4) two kinds of welfare interests: 
 (G) general welfare interests 
 (O) the specific welfare interest in not being offended 
(5) without moral defensibility or justification. 
 
Obviously, any controversy that arises does so from the claims made in (2), (3), and (4). 
As a result, there are two central questions (before the mediating maxims are considered) 
that must be answered by the party arguing for criminalization: 
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 How does such child pornography violate a right, and whose right does it 
violate (considering there is no actual child actor)? [(2)] 
 How does virtual and youthful-looking child pornography setback both 
general welfare interests and the specific welfare interest in not being 
offended? [(3) and (4)] 
 
 As to the first question, recall that – according to Feinberg’s system – a legal right 
(or claim) arises purely as a consequence of having an invested welfare interest. That is, 
whatever one has an invested welfare interest in is something to which the individual also 
has a legal right. Also recall that welfare interests are not limited to individuals, but may 
also extend to communities and governments.  In the case of this new child pornography, 
I would argue that a community interest exists in preventing the over-sexualization of 
children (who are some of the most vulnerable members of any community). There also 
exists a government interest in preventing the over-sexualization of children in the public 
sphere (e.g., in order to maintain a certain baseline of public order or to prevent costs 
incurred due to rising teenage pregnancies). From the evolution of these government and 
community interests arises a public legal right that can be violated in the same way that 
an individual right is violated. 
 Perhaps the community welfare interest in preventing the over-sexualization of 
children is not a tenable position for the Justices to hold. There are other possible welfare 
interests at stake here that merit discussion – most notably, the governmental welfare 
interest in “conducting trials and court hearings” and pursuing justice generally. As noted 
in both the Government’s brief and the concurring opinions in Ashcroft, Congress has a 
“compelling interest in ensuring the ability to enforce prohibitions of actual child 
pornography, and [the Court] should defer to its findings that rapidly advancing 







technological advancements in virtual child pornography would cause severe interference 
with the prosecution of child pornography portraying actual minors, as the virtual and 
non-virtual products are already nearly indistinguishable.
99
 In this case, virtual child 
pornography could be legitimately proscribed insofar as it setbacks the governmental 




 As to the second question, we must turn to the effects of virtual and youthful-
looking child pornography as it is distributed and marketed in the public sphere. Virtual 
and youthful-looking child pornography setback the aforementioned community and 
government interests generally as well as a community interest in not being offended 
(e.g., the combined interests of all the average people within the community in not being 
offended). As to the general welfare interests, such child pornography can clearly not be 
said to setback any specific individuals’ interests in minimum physical or mental health, 
security of private property, bodily autonomy, and the like. However, the community’s 
general welfare interest (in not having children that are themselves over-sexualized or 
done so in the media) is clearly setback by a public distribution of simulated child 
pornography. Specifically, allowing the distribution and marketing of simulated child 
pornography in the public sphere necessarily makes a normative statement: it is 
acceptable for adults to engage in sexual activity involving children. This normative 
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statement clearly defeats the general welfare interests of the community; for example, if it 
is publicly acceptable for adults to engage in sexual activity involving children, then 
children are less likely to report cases of actual abuse.
101
 For the average American, the 
public sexualization of young children ranks as one of the most offensive displays 
possible, and would be a personal affront to the citizens in the community (not relying on 
bare knowledge of its existence).
102
 Indeed, the Court stated in Paris Adult Theater I v. 
Slaton: 
In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming 
the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce 
effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby.
 
Rights and 
interests "other than those of the advocates are involved." Breard v. Alexandria, 
341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951). These include the interest of the public in the quality of 
life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city 




 There may be some lingering doubts as to the force of the above argument. For 
instance, why is the prevention of over-sexualizing the most vulnerable members of a 
community a welfare interest (which can be legally protected) instead of a focal aim 
(which largely cannot be legally protected)? To understand why it is a welfare interest 
(and not a focal aim), it is useful to look at the role of protecting children within the 
liberal society. A certain minimum protection of young children’s sexuality (as much as 
ridding the streets of violent gangs) is necessary to the basic flourishing of any given 
community. Also, such a basic protection furthers the liberal society’s goal of affording 
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the next generation equal opportunity to “enjoy and pursue the good life.”
104
 Over-
sexualization in the public sphere of a community (as mentioned before) decreases the 
reporting of the sexual abuse of children, increases the acceptance of younger 
pregnancies (the health and social costs of which the community and government must 
bear).
105
 Since this is so central to the basic pursuit of equal opportunities, it is more 
appropriately construed as a welfare interest rather than a focal aim. A community’s focal 
aims might include such goals as increasing the proportion of its citizens that obtain 
Ph.D.s in philosophy or neighborhood beautification projects.  
 There may also be the objection that we cannot legislate solely to protect the most 
vulnerable members of a community at the expense of the liberty of other citizens. 
However, I do not argue that we should do so at the expense of others’ individual liberty. 
Instead, we must balance the protection of those with particular vulnerabilities with the 
importance of free speech in the exposition of ideas. We surely cannot make sweeping 
criminal statutes simply to protect the children of a community. Compare the case of 
distributing simulated child pornography to the example of using vulgar words in public. 
We may wish to legislate against using vulgar words in public (in order to protect the 
vulnerabilities of nearby children), but doing so interferes with an important manner of 
expressing certain ideas. In other words, vulgar words have an important social and 
political value that prevents their criminalization.
106
 However, simulated child 
pornography (as determined by the Court in Ferber) does not have any such serious value 
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to the exposition of ideas, and so is open to criminalization. My point has not been to 
prove that the distribution of child pornography is a harmful offense worthy of 
criminalization, but rather to show that it appropriately falls within the realm of harmful 
offense (and neither harm or offense). 
 
Balancing of Mediating Maxims 
 
 Once we have established that simulated child pornography falls within the realm 
of harmful offense, the next serious analysis comes through the balancing of the harmful 
offense principle’s mediating maxims.
107
 Consider the following “standard” example of 
distributing or marketing simulated child pornography. In the town of Complaintsville, 
the company Porn-R-Us distributes very graphic flyers promoting a new adult video store 
that is now renting videos of simulated five year olds having sex with each other and with 
family members. The citizens of Complaintsville go before the Bureau of Harmful 
Offense and argue for legislation criminalizing the public distribution or advertising of 
simulated child pornography.  
 On the part of the offending party (Porn-R-Us), the Bureau must analyze the 
following: 
1. De minimis maxim (the triviality of the act): The distribution triviality has yet 
to be determined, but the townspeople’s reasonable reaction seems to indicate 
that the matter is not trivial. 
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2. Risk of harmful offense (gravity * probability): The distribution of such 
graphic flyers of simulated child pornography is nearly certain set back the 
townspeople’s welfare interest in not being offended and likely to set back the 
community interests established in the previous section. 
3. Personal and social value of conduct: Besides providing a public market for a 
small population of those who find children sexually attractive, there is 
negligible value in the distribution of such flyers.
108
  
On the part of the affected party (the townspeople and the community), the following 
maxims must be examined: 
1. Extent (intensity, duration, and scope): The flyers are stapled to lamp posts, 
passed out to individuals, and dispersed on public walkways near the town’s 
business center. Their duration lasts until they are removed by the 
townspeople or government street-cleaning crews, and the scope of the act 
affects all of the townspeople who work in the business center. 
2. Volenti maxim: There is no sense in which the townspeople or community 
have explicitly consented to being subject to the distribution of these flyers. 
3. Abnormal sensibilities: The reaction of the townspeople is not due to any 
unreasonable or abnormal susceptibilities of the particular individuals.  
As far as this example is concerned, the balancing of mediating maxims seems to allow 
for the criminalization of the marketing and distributing of simulated child pornography. 
Of course, the example can be tweaked so that the mediating maxims may prevent 
criminalization, but the important conclusion is that there are situations in which harmful 
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offense will allow the legitimate criminalization of simulated child pornography in the 
public sphere.  
 
 Where the Supreme Court Went Wrong 
 
 This analysis of simulated child pornography can be extended to the Supreme 
Court’s specific reasons for striking down the CPPA. First, the Supreme Court was 
concerned with the CPPA’s overbreadth and its potential to criminalize valid speech, 
such as “Romeo and Juliet” or “American Beauty.” However, in doing so, the CPPA’s 
restrictions are taken beyond the very context to which it was originally restricted, 
namely, that of hard core “sexually explicit conduct.” The definition – read as a whole in 
context – only targets the “sort of hard core child pornography that was found without 
protection in Ferber.” The CPPA’s definition of child pornography as “any sexually 
explicit image that is, appears to be of, or is pandered as child actors engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct” should not be taken beyond the realm of “sexually explicit conduct.” 
When read in this correct context, the CPPA bans visual or graphic depictions of 
youthful-looking, virtual, or actual child actors engaging in actual sexual activity, yet the 
CPPA would not apply to mere suggestions of such activity that are found in Hollywood 
movies or Shakespearean plays. Thus, the Shakespearean tragedies, teenagers’ hand-
drawn cartoons, and Hollywood movies that the Court was concerned about (e.g., 
“Traffic” or “American Beauty”) would remain protected under the First Amendment. 
Virtual and actual child pornography – as well as pornography made with youthful-
looking adult actors that is pandered as child pornography or made with computer-







Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority opinion in Ashcroft for 
precisely this reason: 
 Other than computer generated images that are virtually indistinguishable from 
 real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the CPPA can be limited so as 
 not to reach any material that was not already unprotected before the CPPA. The 
 CPPA’s definition of “sexually explicit conduct” is quite explicit in this regard. It 
 makes clear that the statute only reaches “visual depictions” of: 
“Actual or simulated…sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-
genital,  anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or 
opposite sex; … bestiality; …masturbation; … sadistic or masochistic abuse; 
… or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. 18 
U.S.C. §2256(2).” 
 
Read as a whole, however, I think the definition reaches only the sort of “hard 
core of child pornography” that we found without protection in Ferber, supra, at 
772-774. … But the inclusion of “simulated” conduct, alongside “actual” conduct, 
does not change the “hard core” nature of the image banned. The reference to 
“simulated” conduct simply brings within the statute’s reach depictions of hard 




In other words, the Court believed the CPPA could not distinguish between a hardcore 
Romeo and Juliet production (protected by the First Amendment) and hardcore, youthful-
looking child pornography (arguably unprotected by the First Amendment).
110
 However, 
the distinction between the two can be made according to (1) the intrinsic value of the 
production and (2) the manner in which the product is described. First, the sexually-
explicit conduct must be examined within the context of its Romeo and Juliet production. 
Taken as a whole work, the Romeo and Juliet production clearly has serious literary, 
artistic, and social value. However, the same cannot be said of hard core, youthful-
looking child pornography; such a work has negligible or very slight social value, as it is 
a stretch of basic reason to consider youthful-looking child pornography seriously artistic 
or seriously political in that it conveys a clear exposition of ideas to its audience. Second, 
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the protection of the explicit Romeo and Juliet work would depend on how it was 
advertised and described by its producers. If such a work were advertised as portraying 
child actors having actual sex on stage, then the work would fall under the criminalized 
distribution under the CPPA. However, if such a work were advertised simply as an 
explicit version of Romeo and Juliet, then the work would clearly be protected. The 
context of a serious portrayal of Romeo and Juliet presumes that the actors are adults who 
are portraying teenage lovers in an explicit scene of lovemaking, and the work’s 
description or manner of advertisement is what bestows protection. Contrarily, typical 
cases of youthful-looking child pornography have no such serious context. The fact that 
two eighteen year old adults are airbrushed and engage in actual sex while intentionally 
portraying children plus its description as portraying minors erases the protection of those 
cases of youthful-looking child pornography. 
 Second, the Supreme Court argued that because there are no actual child actors 
involved in either virtual or youthful-looking child pornography, there is no intrinsic 
relationship between such child pornography and the sexual abuse of children. In other 
words, there is no inherent harm that results from the distribution of virtual or youthful-
looking child pornography. However, the Court inconsistently applies the type of harm 
that is necessary to invoke the rule of Ferber. In Ashcroft, the Court used a very narrow 
definition of “harm” in stating that there was “no harm to any minors” from virtual child 
or youthful-looking adult porn. However, when the Court criminalized child porn in 
Ferber, it did so based on a much broader scope of “harm.” So the Court was inconsistent 
in what determined harm. Looking back at previously upheld cases, the Court defined 







 “…in safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor…” 
Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 US 596 
 “…we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and 
emotional wellbeing of youth even when laws have operated in the sensitive 
area of constitutionally protected rights…” Prince v. Massachusetts, 312 US 
158 
 “The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by 
juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two 
ways. First, …the harm to the child is exacerbated by [the materials’] 
circulation.” New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747 
In these descriptions, harm is used in a much broader scope, including “welfare interests” 
and continued post-production harms through circulation of child pornography. The 
Court mistakenly examines only the narrow scope of direct physical harm that occurs 
during production of child pornography. The decision fails to include other possibilities 
of harm that are likely to result: 
 that children may become overly sexualized in their own lives upon learning 
of the pandering of sexually explicit cartoons of themselves; 
 the emotional and psychological dangers to children who resemble or identify 
with virtual or youthful-looking child pornography. 
 the continued aftereffects of pandering youthful-looking child pornography, 
which is identical to child pornography itself when there is no knowledge of 







 (Most importantly) …the effects of child pornography (virtual, actual, or 
otherwise) on potential abusers of children – twenty years of psychological 
and sociological studies confirm that even brief exposure to such hard core 
pornography makes viewers more aggressive towards children, less 
responsive to suffering of abuse victims, and more willing to accept various 
myths about child abuse and rape. In one study, 77% of child molesters of 
boys and 87% of child molesters of girls admitted imitating the sexual 
behavior they saw modeled in hard core pornography; this modeling of 
sexually abusive behavior by child molesters after all forms of child 
pornography is consistent with imitation learning theories in criminology. 
Although we may doubt the causal connection between simulated child pornography and 
these above harms, the Court has long held that such harms need not be necessarily 
causally tied for the legislature to act on likely harms: 
 Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial 
 behavior and obscene material, the legislature... could quite reasonably determine 
 that such a connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth, this Court implicitly 
 decided that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect 




The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an ample 
basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human 
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of 
human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation 
of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a 
conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive 




 One final note is necessary. It is possible to think of the problem of 
commercialized obscenity and child pornography as a problem of reverse-privacy 
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violations. In a very broad sense, privacy is the welfare interest in excluding others from 
one’s personal domains; in a (reversed) sense, privacy is also the welfare interest in not 
being involuntarily included in the personal domains of others. Individual, community, 
and governmental welfare interests in privacy are well-established in the liberal society. 
As the Court reports from Professor Bickel: 
A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room, or expose himself 
indecently there. . . . We should protect his privacy. But if he demands a right to 
obtain the books and pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather in public 
places – discreet, if you will, but accessible to all – with others who share his 
tastes, then to grant him his right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to 
impinge on other privacies. Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, 
effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is 





The combination and force of these arguments does not necessitate the criminalization of 
distribution or public displays of youthful-looking or virtual child pornography. Rather, 
these arguments intend to show how an analysis of harmful offense exposes the criminal 
law’s constitutional and legitimate jurisdiction over the proscription of virtual and 
youthful-looking child pornography without imposing an unnecessary burden on 
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